Is It Time to End the Promise?

America’s Promise, the crusade led by retired General Colin Powell to mobilize money, volunteers, and new programs to support youngsters in poor neighborhoods, has won some battles but may be losing the war. Indeed, the time may have come for the organization to fade away.

Begun in 1997 at the Presidents’ Summit for America’s Future, America’s Promise was an immediate success because of the importance of its mission, General Powell’s broad appeal, and the backing and enthusiasm of corporate leaders. It was also a resounding political success, giving President Clinton a platform from which to tout the importance of national service in the face of drastic cutbacks in social programs. Republican politicians were pleased with the opportunity to promote private efforts as an antidote to big government.

But in its two and a half years, America’s Promise — a $6-million organization with 51 employees — has been hampered by a weak organizational structure, inexperienced staff members, the development of few real community ties, and a disregard for public accountability.

Clearly, General Powell and his organization have succeeded in raising the awareness of many Americans about the importance of investing in youth. But by stressing new resources and volunteers, the organization unwittingly has shifted the spotlight from youth work in needy neighborhoods to volunteers, corporations, and a few large providers of youth services. Despite the organization’s public-relations efforts, the influence that the crusade really has had on the lives of America’s disadvantaged youth still is not clear.

Part of the problem lies with the organization’s fondness for Hollywood-style glitz and hype. To call public attention to its successes, America’s Promise early this year issued a 643-page “Report to the Nation” documenting the commitments made to the organizations and the extent to which the commitment makers have actually fulfilled their promises. Then in May, General Powell released a three-page “performance measurement” study, conducted by the accounting firm PricewaterhouseCoopers, which claimed that America’s Promise had raised $285-million and had reached more than 10 million young people.

The study, which was done on a pro bono basis, was not a serious assessment of performance but a puff piece based on unsubstantiated information provided by only 91 of the 441 organizations that had made a commitment to America’s Promise. Susan Ellis, president of Energize, a for-profit company that works with managers of volunteers, wryly observed that since 20 per cent of the commitment makers claimed to have served 20 per cent of all Americans under age 17 (about 50 million), then all 441 commitment makers must have reached the nation’s entire population of adolescents.

PricewaterhouseCoopers acknowledged that it had not verified any of the data provided by the commitment makers. What’s more, neither the auditing firm nor General Powell has been willing to release the full report to the public.

That is not the only information that the organization has been unwilling to release. The 1997 informational tax return the organization submitted to the Internal Revenue Service did not disclose the compensation paid to its top officers and key employees. America’s Promise skirted that requirement by entering into what some observers consider to be a highly unusual arrangement — especially for so large an organization — with the billion-dollar for-profit management company Administaff, based in Kingwood, Tex. According to the terms of its contract with America’s Promise, Administaff not only handles the payroll and other administrative responsibilities but is considered to be an official co-employer of America’s Promise’s staff. Because of its for-profit status, Administaff does not have to disclose to the public the salaries it pays.

Partly as a result of growing news-media demand for greater disclosure, America’s Promise’s 1998 tax forms provided the salaries of all officers and key employees, but left some unanswered questions about additional income paid to its executives. One of the reasons for the organization’s initial lack of public accountability was its Board of Directors, which has served more as a cheerleader for General Powell than as a tough policy and oversight committee.

Several recent reports in the news media have further undermined America’s Promise’s credibility. In its summer issue, the magazine Youth Today reported that America’s Promise had failed to meet many of its goals; had been slow to form local coalitions of corporate, non-profit, and government organizations; had not involved many grassroots youth and activist organizations; and had a poor record of evaluating its performance and that of local efforts it helped to set up. And a recent Bloomberg News Services story reported, among other things, that a number of corporations listed as commitment makers by America’s Promise have said that they would have started or expanded programs to help young people regardless of whether they had been urged to do so by General Powell and his organization.

The reports confirmed what many non-profit organizations have been saying. Many feel that grassroots and small youth-service providers, as well as policy and activist organizations, have not been involved in or benefited much — if at all — from America’s Promise’s national or local activities. A few of the large youth-service organizations, such as Big Brothers Big Sisters and the Boys & Girls Clubs, appear to have been the major beneficiaries of new money at the local level. And a good portion of expanded business commitments have actually gone to corporate-run volunteer programs, not to youth workers in needy neighborhoods. In other words, the initial promise of a broad coalition has not been fulfilled.

America’s Promise initially pledged to close its doors in 2000, but it has now decided to extend its life for at least two more years. The reason, according to staff members, is that the organization is taking longer than anticipated to reach its goals. Moreover, they say there is an urgent need to capitalize on the enormous momentum created by General Powell.

The latter point, of course, is a problem for America’s Promise. As one board member put it, “Without Powell, there is no movement, no crusade.”

Perhaps it is time for America’s Promise to declare victory, close its doors in 2000, and transfer its functions to another non-profit organization. One possibility is the Points of Light Foundation, which was poised and wanted to take on these responsibilities after the summit. Although the Points of Light Foundation does not focus exclusively on youth, many of its activities have revolved around youth development and volunteering. What’s more, its budget of $14-million and experienced staff could insure a smooth transition. Its network of 450 volunteer centers and more than 250 corporate members could provide a solid base from which to expand America’s Promise’s work.

In Colin Powell, the country has an invaluable resource with which to raise the level of investment in America’s young people, especially its most disadvantaged youth. He is the “added value” of America’s Promise. Given the right support, the General could easily operate within the framework of the Points of Light Foundation or another organization.

Indeed, his efforts cannot afford to be undermined by America’s Promise’s weak organizational structure, poor public accountability, and diminishing public confidence. The General and his board should not let America’s Promise become America’s disappointment.

Pablo Eisenberg is senior fellow at the Georgetown University Public Policy Institute and vice-chair of the National Committee for Responsive Philanthropy. He is a regular contributor to these pages.