Lessons Learned After September 11

Before becoming chief executive of the September 11th Fund, I had never worked in the nonprofit world. My career was split between business and government. However, because the fund was created by the New York Community Trust and the United Way of New York City, received donations from thousands of foundations, and made grants to more than 200 nonprofit organizations, I had a unique opportunity to work with charities as they faced the extraordinary challenges of the tragedy of September 11. I came away appreciating both the strengths and limitations of philanthropy, and with a few ideas for how to respond more effectively in the future:

Experience counts, and experienced charities delivered. With the double whammy of an unsupportive press and the passage of time, it’s easy to forget that charities provided most of the early assistance to individuals and families affected by the attacks, that they did so more quickly and reliably than comparable government programs, and that they did so in the face of the largest disaster in U.S. history.

Thousands were affected, and their needs varied. Some needed cash to cover living expenses, others lawyers to get into their bank accounts. Some needed doctors; others, just someone to listen. Government support was available, to be sure: disaster funds from Medicaid, cash for families of the uniformed victims, and so on. But in most cases those programs were slow in providing help and restrictive in their eligibility requirements. The charities provided help both more flexibly and much more quickly.

No one claims that the relief agencies were perfect, but overall they got a bad rap.

Experience clearly helped. The Red Cross had years of practice providing help to victims of crime or disaster, as did charities like New York’s Safe Horizon. They had volunteers trained and systems in place. Those systems were not designed for so huge a disaster, but imagine how much worse we would have been without them.

Charities should stick to their strengths. When nonprofit groups did get into trouble, it was when they ignored their basic skills in trying to help. A now-classic guidebook advises businesses to “stick to the knitting”: Excellent companies succeed by doing more of what they already do well. Diversifying into something that requires different skills is usually a recipe for failure.

Nonprofit groups are no different. Everyone with an ounce of compassion wanted to help after September 11, and hundreds of groups came forward thinking they could do so. But the scale and range of needs created by the attacks were extraordinarily broad, and not every organization recognized its limitations.

Some disaster-relief charities insisted on performing counseling and case management, though without sufficient staff or experience to do so. Others, particularly newly created charities, decided to enter the cash-assistance business even though they lacked the experience and infrastructure. Some gave to those who already had received much; others had trouble even finding those in need. The result was more dollars spent, but not better service or more people helped. It was compassion, but not competence.

Nor were grant makers immune from this hubris. Many made commitments without having the staff and experience for informed judgment. Instead of working with more experienced, better-staffed grant makers, many chose to work alone, with less-effective results: Some made grants to the already well-supported or for which the need was less than originally thought. For example, millions were committed for the orphans of September 11, even though very few children were actually orphaned. Others simply redefined their existing grantees as “September 11-related.”

When in the spotlight, use it — or else. Most nonprofit groups toil for years without ever showing up on the evening news. Many never even make the local papers. September 11 was different. Charities came under the inquisitive eye of thousands of journalists, most of whom hadn’t the faintest idea how charities work. In this extraordinary cauldron, both sides failed, and the public was, as a result, sadly misinformed.

Under the pressure of deadlines and ratings, many reporters and editors focused on accusations of incompetence and scandal. Charities helping people just wasn’t “news.” Reporters had little interest or patience for explanations that charitable support was based on need and that victims needed counseling and other help, not just cash. Many mistook the grief and rage of the victims as proof of charitable incompetence. This combination of “seek only evil, hear only evil, and speak only evil” was itself a disaster. The fact that charities had performed an extraordinary service was lost in the din, largely unreported even by reputable newspapers and trade publications.

But it was the charities’ story to tell, and it was charities that paid the price when it wasn’t. The American Red Cross was helping thousands, but its failure to explain the longstanding practice of reserving funds for future disasters created suspicion. Eventually, the Red Cross decided to change its practices rather than justify them, but not before millions became skeptical, in my view quite unfairly, of the organization’s integrity and competence.

After some missteps, the Red Cross created a public-education campaign in newspapers across the country to explain its actions. Red Cross officials realized that the press simply would not report its side of the story. That kind of effort is routine in the business world and might be advisable for nonprofit groups as well. There’s certainly still plenty of misinformation about charitable efforts in the “common knowledge.”

At the September 11th Fund, we recognized the extraordinary level of interest and resolved to set the standard for openness. We explained our programs repeatedly and in detail, through a dogged succession of press conferences, interviews, reports, public-service announcements, e-mails, and extensive use of our Web site. At first, it was frustrating because accusations were far more widely reported than our correction of the record. Nonetheless, ultimately the fund was relatively well-treated: the news media rarely reported our activities, but neither did they carry unjust accusations.

Sometimes charities must support each other. One way in which nonprofit groups behave quite differently from business is that the latter bands together when an entire industry is being attacked. At such times, competitors become allies. Within weeks of the Enron scandal, for example, industry groups began visiting Washington decision makers.

During the firestorm of criticism of the Red Cross, by contrast, the response of most other nonprofit groups was silence. That, in turn, left an open microphone for self-appointed “experts” like Daniel Borochoff, creator of a watchdog group, the American Institute of Philanthropy, who pandered to the press and who, despite no apparent experience in disaster relief, gave the air of legitimacy to their accusations.

This ostrichlike “head in the sand” approach to public relations didn’t work, because the damage and misinformation that resulted were not limited to the Red Cross; public support for charities generally was eroded. Most unsettling was the enthusiasm with which others in the nonprofit “community,” thinking themselves somehow protected, later joined gleefully in a round of uninformed self-criticism. Foundation executives hundreds of miles away who did nothing except make contributions — and who had no knowledge of how those who helped actually performed — nonetheless opined fulsomely to reporters on how charities needed to improve. They seemed not to understand that the mud might end up on their own shoes, with disappointment and distrust even among their own donors.

Unfortunately, even now few know of the tremendous job that both charities and businesses did to lessen the trauma of September 11. What was truly heartening was the way institutions across the country pitched in, individuals, businesses and nonprofits alike. Nothing can or will undo the damage experienced on September 11, but by working together everyone is helping to rebuild. My most powerful impression remains a much greater respect for the competence, compassion, and dedication of the thousands in nonprofits that struggle, every day, to help people improve their lives. We are all in their debt.

Joshua Gotbaum was chief executive officer of The September 11th Fund from October 2001 to October 2002. The views expressed here are his own.